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The article gives a derailed account of rhe decisions about and activities 
of the UN peace-keeping forces (UNPROFOR) in Croatia since the end 
of 1991. The author analyses the reasons for the failure to accomplish 
its tasks of UNPROFOR in Croatia and demonstrates that the main obstacle 
has been the refusal of the Serbian side to cooperate in the implementlltion 
of the original UNPROFOR mandate. He argues that the question of 
prolonging the UNPROFOR mandate offers a chance to re-ex.amine and 
redefin.e tt according to experience to date. 
To understand military and political developments in the Republic of Croatia 
since the autumn of 1991, the role and activities of the United Nations must be 
considered in settling Lhe conflict between d1e Republic of Croatia, on one hand, 
and the Yugoslav Army, Serbia and Monrenegro, and local Serb rebels, on the 
other. United Nations activities are felt in various ways, directly and indirectly, 
but most of all in the deployment of UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) a a'> 
peace-keeping force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Although the UN 
military presence as peace-keepers was not in itself crucial for keeping the peace, 
nor did it lead to the results that had at first been expected, it nevertheless had 
a great influence, and st11l does, on the development of the militaty and political 
situation in Croaria and its surroundings. 
When Croatia was brutally attacked by the milltarily stronger forces of the 
Yugoslav Anny, Serbia, Montenegro and Serbian rebels from Croatia itself, the 
Croatian authorities from the very beginning worked to intemarionalize the conflict 
and obtain the support and help of world democratic forces, in the first place 
of the democratic countries of the West. This help for tile main part failed to 
materialize, and Croatia was especially harmed by the arms embargo for the whole 
of Yugoslavia. This gave the Yu~oslav Army and the more numerous Serbian 
military forces, which disposed of munense amounts of weapons and ammunition, 
a . frightening superiority. True, the European Community sent its Monitoring 
Missions (ECMM) to observe what was happe.ning, report to their goverrunents 
and mediate between the conflicting forces, but at the time of Lhe Brijuni 
Declaration of 7 July 1991 it was already clear that the crisis could not be peaceably 
resolved through the efforts of Lhat Mission only. 
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The fury of the war and Croatia's military success surprised the world. In spire 
of a military atlvanrage, the aggressor did not manage to defeat Croatia. This 
opened up perspectives fur a long-lasting war and made rhe disintegration of 
Yugoslavia inevitable. In October and November 1991, in spite of minor successes, 
the strong enemy offensive was crushed. Croatia's great military, political and moral 
victory matle international recognition imminent, and the aggressor had to re-
examine his military and political aims. He rejected the plan to conquer all of 
Croatia and limired himself instead to securing the borders of an imagined ''Greater 
Serbia", all the time using djplomatic initiatives to gain time for a respite and 
the consoUdation of his own ranks. 
UN Securi9' Council Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 expressed full 
support for efforts of the internationa.l community to bring peace and dialogue 
to Yugoslavia. It especially supported the monitors of the cessa.tion of hostilities 
in Yugoslavia and rhe smooth development of the political process ar the Conference 
on Yugoslavia. It called on all sides in the conflict to resolve their differences 
peaceably, and on the UN Secretary General to offer his services in agreement 
with the Yugoslav government. Although Croatia had prodaimed independence 
on 7 October 1991 and broken off all State relarions with Yugoslavia, rhe UN 
continued ro consitler Yugoslavia the only legal entity with which to maintain 
official relations. After the Geneva Agreement lo suspend hoso1ities, deblock 
Yugoslav Anny barracks in Croatia and withdraw YA troOps, weapons and military 
equipment from those barracks, which was signed on 23 November; the letter 
of the UN Secretary General to the Chairman of the Securjty Council in cormection 
w1th the mission in Yugoslavia of his official envoy Cyrus Vance; and the initiative 
of the Yugoslav government in connection with keeping peace in Yugoslavia from 
26 November; on 27 November the Security Councfl broughl Resolution 721 
demanding that me Secretary General urgently propose thal the Uoired Nations 
take over responsibility for keeping peace in Yugoslavia. The Security Council 
undenook to irnmedtately examine the Secretary General's recommendations and 
reach an appropriate dec.ision. It explicitly demanded the parties in the cont1ict 
in Yugoslavia to completely honour the Geneva Agreement of 23 November. Thus 
the UN peace-keeping operation beganJ under condition of a holding cease-fire. 
Mer consultations, lhe Croalian side agreed to the peace operations planned seeing 
in them a chance to gain peace and ensure independence in a peaceable manner, 
without more substantial loss of life, sacrifice and destruction. 
On 11 December 1991 rhe Proposal for the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Operation in Yugoslavia was made public, as Supplement llJ to the UN Secretary 
General's Report. 11le proposal. publicly known as the Vance Plan, was developed 
by Cyrus Vance, personal envoy of the UN Secremry General, and Marrack 
Goulding, assistant to the Secretary General for special political issues. All the 
parties in the conflict accepted the proposed peace plan. 
The UN peace operation on the territory of Yugoslavia was conceived as a 
temporary arrc:tngement, with the goal of creating conditjons for peaceful 
negotiations about the overall solution of the crisis. Special emphasis was laid 
on the fact that it did not prejudicx: the outcome of those negotiations. A condition 
for im- plementing rhe operation was that all the panies in the conflict must 
seriously and con.~srently adhere to the agreemenL, especially to the unconditional 
cease-fire that h ad been reached in Geneva on 23 November. The military forces 
that UN member srates were to supply to the Secretary General were ro be 
completely neutral and could use force only in self-defence. 
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The basic concepr of Lhe plan called for United Nations forces and police 
monitors (UNPROFOR) ro be deployed on the territory of Croalia in areas named 
Unired Nations Protected Areas (UNPA). These areas were ro be demilitarized. 
all armed forces were ro withdraw from Lhcrn or be disbanded, and UN protection 
forces were m guarantee the implementation and maintenance of demilitarization. 
Police monitors were to supervise the work of the local police, prevent 
discrimination against persons of any nationality and ensure rhe protection of 
human rights. The Yugoslav Army was to withdraw from all of Croatia. UNPROFOR, 
in cooperation with UN humanir-ct.rian agencies, was to ensure rhe peaceful and 
safe rerum of displaced persons to the "prorecred areas". 
The protected areas were areas in which. in tbe opinion of UN Secretary 
General, special measures were needed in the rransitory period, until an overall 
political solution was reached, to ensure the cease-fire. It was explicitly stated 
that these were areas in which the Serbs are a majority population or a significant 
minority population and where ''tension among communities has resulted in 
conflict". After that specific areas in eastern and western Slavonia were named, 
in Banija, Kordun, Lika and northern Dalmatia. 1hose areas were exacrly defmed 
in the field by UN advam.'C parties in consultation with local authorities.The plan 
was made with the best inrentions, but the approach was wrong. Of course peace 
and security must be achieved, human rightS protected, the displaced must return 
to their homes, but ir was wrong to assume that tension and conflict in the areas 
with ethnically mixed populations resulted from a threat to the safety and human 
rights of the Serbian population. This was the Serbian interpretation of the events, 
bur the Croatian side clearly showed that the local revolts of the Serbian population 
in Croaria were part of a wider straregy of the Yugoslav Army and Serbia ro 
impose their political solutions on Croatia within the framework of Yl.lgoslavia, 
using armed aggression. Thus the basic problem is how to protect Croatia from 
aggression, not how ro protect the local Serbian (>?pularion from posstble excesses 
of the Croatian nuthorities or irresponsible individuals on the Croalian side. This 
second problem can successfully be solved only after the basic problem of 
aggression against Croatia is solved, in which a large nwnber of local Serbs 
participated. That is why the Croatian side was not completely satisfied with the 
concept of the Vance Plan, but it nevertheless saw in it the possibility of ensuring 
the integrity ·and independence of Croatia in a peaceful way, without further 
destruction and loss of life, and by using extensive political and diplomatic iniriative. 
When Croatia agreed to rhe Vance Plan, itS great battle for imemational recognition 
began. 
The Serbian side, on the orher hand, continued nlilitary operations, wanting 
to gain control over as great as possible a territory by force before the final 
agreement on the implementation of the Vancc Plan. However, after military 
setbacks in some areas, conscious of the great probability that Croatia would soon 
be internationally recognized, on 2 January 1992 in Sarajevo the Serbian side 
agreed to the complete suspension of hostilities. Wanting to sign a peace plan 
before Croatia's intemarional recognition, the Serbian side confirmed that it 
completely accepted the plan and would fully cooperate in its implementation, 
bur at the same time demanded additional guaranteeS for local Serbian 
communities in Croatia. 
lt was at this moment that the UN made a fatal mistake, which later backf1red 
and caused the greatest difficulty in the implementation of the Vance Plan. Because 
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of the alleKcd concern for Serbian communities that were to come lJnder UN 
protection, insread of demanding guarantees from the Croalian side, in whose 
territory and among whose populalion they are. Mr Goulding, in the name of 
the UN, gave his own interpretation of the status of the "protected areas". 
According ro him, me UN peace mission would not end until an uoverall political 
solution of me Yugoslav crisis" had been achieved, the deployment of UN forces 
would not change the scarus QIJO, and for the present the laws and insrirutions 
of the Republic of Croatia would nor be valid in areas under UN proteCtion. This 
interpretation is contrary to the spirit and meaning of the Vance Plan and to the 
opinion of the international Arbitration Commission chaired by R. Badinter, 
according ro which th~ existing borders of the Republic of Croatia are considered 
frontiers in the sense of international law and according ro which loc.:al Serb 
communities have no right to sclfdetermi.nation. Gouldi.ng's interpretation placed 
the territoriaJ integrity of the Republic of Croaria in doubt, encouraging Serbian 
separatist aspirations, and re1.tricted UN peace force activities by approving local 
Serb aumorities, which had been created through anned aggression against Croatia. 
The Croarian side protested, and embodied in its new Constitution the required 
additions concerning the protection ofhuman rights and rhe rights of ethnic com· 
munitics, and international control of that protection. Bur rhis had no basic 
influence on the status of the "protected areas", Goulding's guarantees only 
encouraged rhe local rebel forces to ignore the Croarian guarantees. 
The process of international recognition of the Republic of Croatia ran 
collaterally. Croatia's high level of coopcralivity, the guarantees given in the 
Constitution for the protection of human and ethnic rights, with special guarantees 
for the autonomy of the Serbian ethnic community in Croalia, speeded up 
recognition of the Republic of Croalia as a sovereign and independent state within 
its existing borders, and its acceprance in the UN and other international 
organizations. The Vanc:e Peace Plan. which explicidy stares that it does not 
prejudice political solutions, should have been adapted to the new internationally 
verified politil-al situation, bur UN represem-ativcs rigidly adhered to the initial 
framework that had in the meantime disappeared. Thus their attitude towards 
new political realities was negatively prejudiced. To wait for an "overall political 
solution of the Yugoslav crisis" in a situation when the common state had 
disappeared and when individual srares on il:s territory had become internationally 
recognized is a dangerous illusion, which implicitly supports Serbian expansionist 
prelensions. 
Long and difficult Lalks were held on this subject with UN representatives, and 
the Croatian authorities several times cautioned about the danger that the peace 
process might be blocked and compromised. The UN was brought into a state 
of confusion and inertia by its lack of dear insight into the political processes 
that had led to the armed conflict and the way in which it could be resolved, 
and this was an advantage for the side in the conflict th~t .disposed of KfCater 
might. The Croatian side saw this danger dearly, but did not have much choice 
because it could not aUow itself to discard me Vance Plan IIJld be charged with 
refusing a peaceful solution. lr counted on the logic of the peace plan itself and 
on the consistency of the people who were to imple:mem it. Thus Croatia agreed 
to the Vance Plan and lhe coming and deployment of the UN forces that were 
ro implement it. 
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In J:Ursuance of Securily Council Resolurion 740 of 7 February and 743 of 
21 February 1992, the UNPHOFOR operation in Croatia began with the arrival 
of so liaison officers commanded by Colonel Wilson. That woup was joined by 
25 more officers, and on 10 March 1992 the UNPROFOR advance party arrived 
in Zagrcb with irs Commander-in-Chief General Satish Nambiar and his staff. 
Separate areemenrs were made with the Government of the Socialist Federal 
Republic o Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Croaria about 
UNPROFOR deployment, and Sarajevo was chosen as beadquarrecs. Since this was 
ro be a peace mission in Croatia, this arrangement shows the UN's insufficiently 
defined attitude towards relations in Yugoslavia and the status of Croatia A lm 
was ceded to the Serbian side by not mentioning the status of Croaria as a state 
and by not definjng irs complete territory as an UNPA zone. Concessions to the 
Serbian side were motivated by the need for cooperation with Lhc Yugoslav 
authorities and local Serbian authorities, bur they encroached on some questions 
of principle and were not acceptable to the Croatian side. The Croars made several 
objections of principle when the agreement on the status of UNPROFOR in Croatia 
was being defined, especially in connection with the names of acr:s and the 
defmilion of some concepts. Thus t:he agreemem was never si~ed. In its 
declaraP-ions of 10 and 21 February the Govemmenr of the Republic of Croaria 
made it dear that by accepting the peace plan as a whole, it was not underotkin.g 
any obligations outside the framework established by the plan nor for its arbitrary 
interpreration, and that it considered that only the laws and institutions, i.e. the 
legal order, of the Republic of C.roaria could be valid in "protected areas". 
Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 charged UN Secretary 
General with instituting UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and deploying them 
as soon as possible in the crisis areas, as demanded by the peace plan. The operation 
was to last for 12 months, unless me Securiry Council decided otherwise in the 
meantime. The resolution again emphasized that the UN peace plan and its 
implementation did not prejudice the political solution in any way, and the Yugoslav 
parties were called on to cooperate with the Conference on Yugoslavia to achieve 
a political solution in accord with rhe principles of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Resort to the principles of the CSCE as a 
framework for the politicaJ solution was a new and very important element, because 
it determined the framework for the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and 
indirectly also th.e fran1ework for the work of UNPROFOR. Since it was the UN 
that had prescribed that framework for the Conference on Yugoslavia, it was also 
required for the activities of UN bodies and UNPROFOR. The principles of the 
CSCE are more than relevant for honouring borders, the position of minorities, 
protecting human rights and the like, and provide important guidelines for possible 
unclear points and different interpretations of rhe peace plan. 
Unfortwtately, rhis was not sufficiently taken inro consideration when the peace 
plan was being developed. The operative plan kept strictly to the Vance Plan from 
December 1991, when SFR Yugoslavia had been the only subject of international 
law. Thus the operative plan was developed as a plan for Yugoslavia, not for 
Croatia, which had in the meantime become a subject of international law wirh 
completely detem1incd state frontiers. The UNPROFOR headquarters were placed 
in Sarajevo, with logistic bases in Banja Luka, Belgrade and Zagreb, and an engineer 
battalion in Banja Luka For support to the forces in Croaria Croatian objections 
thar the operation had been determined only for Croaria and that Croaria was 
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now an inremationally recognized state with its own frontiers were always 
countered by saying that the UNPROFOR operation d.oes not prejudice political 
solutions, although such behaviour clearly did prejudice il. The cleploymem of forces 
was always considered a professional am.l military matter completely at the 
discretion of the UNPROFOR commander-in-chief. ln fact it, t.oo, was to a grear 
degree political. The facr rhat rhe headquarters were in Sarajevo made more 
frequent and fruitful cooperation for Croatia impossible. All the later difficullics 
in communication showed that the choice of Sarajevo and Banja Luka had been 
completely wrong, especially afTer the war in Bosnia-Hcrcegovina broke out. The 
headquaners first moved to Belgrade, then to Zasueb, and the logistics base moved 
!Tom Banja Luka to Zagrcb. This led to great aelay in the deployment of forces 
and taking over responsibility in the "protected areas", and to additional expense. 
These mistakes resulted from the rigid application of rhf' initial conception although 
the international legal conditions bad later changed, also of a mist-c:tken appraisal 
of milirary and political conditions. 
The "protected areas" in Croatia are not one geographical whole and are divided 
into four operative sectors. UNPROFOR has the rask of covering the whole 
"protected" territory, not only the line of cease fl.l'e, and after lhe withdrawal of 
the YNA to disarm the remaining military units, ensure lamng demilitarization, 
help the establishment of civilian authorities and secure the return of displaced 
persons and refugees. Twelve infanuy battalions were deployed for that purpose: 
rwo in the Easrcm Sector (along the Danube), four iin the Wesrem Sector (in 
western Slavonia), three in the Northern Sector (in cenrral Croatia) and three 
in the Southern Sector (in l.ika and northern Dalmatia). To those forces were 
added a headquarters company, a traffic control unit. a battalion of engineers, 
logistics battalion, signal-rorps battalion, construction barralion, medical unit and 
1 00 military observers, whose LCISk it was ro monitor the implementation of 
demilitarization and then move inro Bosnia-Hercegovina to control the borderline 
with Croada. 
As for the UNPRO.FOR police force, it ho.d originally been decided to deploy 
530 police, bur larer that number was reduced somewhat. A small number of 
civilians were recruited from among rhe local population. 
The total number of pcr.:ons engaged in the UNPROFOR operation in Croatia 
- was 14,000. This is one of the most extensive UN peace-keeping operations, and 
was granted a budget of US ~608 million. The unirs are lightly armed and without 
the right to fire except in self-defence. UNPROFOR's militruy power is relatively 
modest in comparison wirh modem combat units of similar size, but its political, 
moral and psychological power is much greater. In evaluating UNPROFOR's role 
the discrepancy between its military power and irs overall influence must always 
be born tn mind. Another important factor of these forces is that they are 
multinational, made up of soldiers from countries with varied t.caditions. 
UNPROFOR operations in Croatia engage military and civilian personnel from 27 
countries. 
UNPROFOR should have taken over responsibility iJn the "protected areas" on 
25 April, but the date was moved to the middle of May. The organization of 
the units' arrival and deployment showed itself to he more complex than had 
been expected, and the. fighting in Sarajevo and the constant breaches of the cease-
fire in Croatia made the implementation of itS tasks much more difficult. The 
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fierce shelling of towns in Croatia continued (Osijek, Vinkovci, Dubrovnik). 
However, the situation in Croatia gradually quietened as war erupted in full 
violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which placed the peace operation in a completely 
new context. 
YNA withdrawal from Croatia, called for by the Vance Plan, showed itself to 
be more in the function of Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina than the 
establishment of peace in Croatia. YNA military units retreated into Bosnia-
Hercegovina to join war operations rhere, leaving UNPROFOR to guard the 
"protected areas" in Croatia from possible attack by the Croatian a.tmy. In addition, 
before it withdrew the YNA handed over a lot of weapons and ammunition to 
the local Serbian territorial defence, and rransferred parr of the weapons and 
personnel to the local police force . The peace plan called for all those forces to 
be disarmed and disbanded, but this was not done. 1\ small amount of heavy 
weaponry was placed in warehouses under formal UNPROI10R custody, hut always 
remained in reach of local military units. Demilitarization, which was a key element 
of the Vance Peace Plan, did not achieve its purpose in practice because weaporu; 
that were withdrawn from Croatia contributed to greater military acriviries in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and those that remained were at the disposal of military units 
in the "protected areas". What is worse, the Serbian authorities in "protected areas" 
felt s,afer in the presence of UNPROFOR and continued aggression using new 
methods. They began to banish the non-Serbian population from those areas, 
plundering and destroying their property and creating ethnically clean areas with 
the obvious intention of preventing their tetum and creating conditions for those 
areas ro break off from Croatia. The local Serbian authorities used UNPROFOR 
presence to make it impossi~le to implement the peac~ plan and ~o turn occ~pation 
mto a permanent state. This placed the UN protecuon forces m the postnon of 
protecting aggression instead of implementing the peace plan and guardjng the 
interests of the population and state to which those areas legally belong. 
UNPROFOR, of course, was conscious of this abuse, they often protested and tried 
to protect the threatened population, but these were only emergency measures. 
In most cases the members of UNPROFOR were the helpless witnesses of violence 
they were powerless to stop. The Serbia.tl tactics were to provoke incidents on 
the line of eease-ftrc and engage UNPROFOR along this boundary line towards 
Croatian forces, thus making sure of nor being attacked from that quarter and 
preventing the UN from controlling what was going on in the whole protected 
area. 
UNPROFOR made another great mistake in its interpretation of the Vance Peace 
Plan by giving the status of "local civilian authorities" called for in that plan to 
the illegal authorities that had been installed by aggression. The peace plan calls 
for the establishment of local authorities on the principle of proportional ethnic 
represent~tio1~ wh~ch is yet. to be established. !JNPRO~qR did not even try ro. 
do anything m this field, lllStead they recogn1zed ex1stm.g structures as local 
representatives. Besides, when the Vance Pla.t1 mentions "protected ares" in the 
plural fom1, it means occupieJ areas of Croatia that never had any common 
authorities except the authorities of the Croatian state, whereas UNPROFOR 
recognized the self-named government in Knin as the representative of "local 
authorities" in all the protected areas. UNPROFOR did not, of course, recognize 
the so-called Serbian Republic of Krajina as a state, but through its contacts with 
the "government" in Knin it encouraged the occupying authorities to feel that they 
r 
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were at leasr rolerarcd. Instead of thar. UNPROf.Oll should have established 
contactS with local t~urhorities in each of lhe areas separt~re l y, which would have 
been a more adequate inrerprerarion of the (."Qnccpt of "local authorities". 
When the deployment of UNPROFOR forces in the "protected areas" was being 
discussed a question arose that surpasses the framework of the UN peace plan. 
The peace plan did not include among the "protected ares" in Croaria some areas 
that were under YNA control. The Serbian side demandL'<i that those areas, roo, 
should be included among the "protected areas". The Cmarian side did not agree 
to rhis, but requested UNPROFOR help because of rhe presence of Serbian 
paramilitary unirs in those areas and their links with ~imilar uniLS in the "protected 
areas", and th.e threars that the Serbian side would reject the Vanc:c Plan. This 
is how the problem of the so-called "pink zones" arose. 
Long talks were held on rhis issue during Goulding's visit ar the beginning 
of May. The Vancc Plan called for immediate and unconditional Croatian control 
over those areas after the withdrawal of the YNA, but because of the danger 
of new hostilities, on rhe imi~ilcnce of the UN, Croatia agreed for UNPROFOR 
and rhe EC Monitoring Mission ro monitor and help the establishment of Croatian 
rule th.ere ro make sure the whole process evolved in peace and order. UN Secrerary 
General said as much in his report to the Security Council on 26 June 1992, 
expres:;ing his special thanks to the Govcrruncnt of Croatia. 
UN insistence on the special stc1tus of t.hc "pink zones" was explained by t.hcir 
ethnically mixed character, which was not acceptable to Croatia because me 
Croatian state guarantees the protection of human and ethnic rights to all citizens 
in itS territory. NevenheJess, it agreed to the arrangement tTilSring in the UN and 
EC tO use all the means at their disposal to reach the solution agreed on. For 
itS mission in the "pink zones" UNPROFOR gor 60 new military observers and 
120 civilian policemen to direct and monitor the esrablishme.nt: of Croatian rule 
in agreement with the Croarian Government and all others concerned. The UN 
Security Council entrusted this task ro a Joint Commission chaired by an 
UNPROFOR represennttive and including representatives of the EC Monitoring 
Mission, the Government of the Republic of Croatia and local authorities. ThiS 
time, too, the UN Secretariat interpreted "local" authorities as authorities from 
the self-named "Republic of Serbian Krajina". Thus they placed t.he "pink zones", 
which should by decision of the Security Council unconditionaUy have been 
returned to Croalia, under the authority of the Knin "government". 
Introducing t.he Knin "government"' into the Joint Commission and inm the 
decision-making process about the "pink zones" blocked the Conunission's work 
right. from the start. Instead of cooperating in the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 762, the Serbian side proclaimed the "protected areas" and 
the "pink zones" a single "state" and the line of cease-fire the border of that "staTe" 
with Croatia.. Thus it explicilly rejected the Va.ncc Plan and that resolution. The 
Croadan side insisted on an immediate ultimatum to the Serbian side: either 
they cooperate on implementing the resolution, or work on the establishment of 
Croatian rule will continue without them (in the worst case the Security CounclJ 
will be informed of the failure). lnstead, UNPROFOR representatives continued 
with useless attempts to persuade the Serbian sicte to cooperate. After several lost 
months, eight meetings of the Joint Commission an? several meetings of 
subcommittees, on 9 November 1992 UNPROFOR established that not even lhe 
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first step had been raken in realizing the mandare and that the work of the 
Commission was to be terminated for the pre-sent. 
Similar developments occurred in the "protected areas" where UNPROFOR 
responstbiliries were greater am.l more direct. There UNI'HOFOR quietly watched 
the establishment of a Serbian "Stare" in Croaria and preparations for its 
"unification" with other Serbian states. Security Council Resolution 769 of 7 August 
1992, which confirms the proposals of the Secrerary General's repon, gave 
UNPROFOR a new task: to eStablish control over Croaria's intcnational borders 
with Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in places "vhere they coincide with the borders 
of the "protected areas" and "pink zones", nor only for rhe crossing of weapons, 
ammunition and other \vat material, but also the crossing of lhe population and 
customs control. This was of great imparLance because Serbian military units, which 
UNPROFOil was ro have disanned, crossed inro llosnia-Hercegovina with all their 
weapons, fought there and freely renune~ to Croatia. Various paramUirary units 
from Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also came ro Croada and 
then returned. The Basrem Secror, which lies along the Danube, was used for 
infringing the economic sanctions the UN had introduced against FR Yugoslavia. 
Thus lhe cono·ol of Croatia's international borders might essentially contribute to 
ending the war in Bosnia-llercegovina and implementing the Vance Plan in Croatia. 
UNPROFOR did no more than make some shy attempts ro fullill this task. Some 
UNPROFOR members in the !?.&tern Sector even took part in infringing the imports 
embargo into FR Yugoslavia. 'lhe local non-Serbian popularion in Croatian areas Under 
UN protct.tion is coru.tantly exposed to expulsion and the plunder of their pro- perty, 
and people from other states are moving into their homes. Since the an:iYal of 
UNPROFOR, about 600 Croats were killed aDd severdl thouo;and expeUed in the E&tem 
Sector only. All the Croatian population ~ •cleansed" fmm the other sectors. They 
w-ere either killed or expelled, ana UPROFOR did J10[ offer them any protection except 
~P in I:I'ampOrting them to t~ under Croarian conrrol. The same is true of tbe 
pink l.OI'ld", from which the Ooanan popularion was also expelled. 
As a whole, UNPROFOR presence an Croatia has not even approximately 
achieved the results expecred. Indeed, ir has made it easier for the Serbian rebels 
to fortify their illegal rule, impose themselves as the only representatives of the 
Serbian population in the occupied areas. carry our ethnic cleansing and more 
or less join up Croatian regions under UN prOtection with Serbia and the so-
called Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina. UNPROFOR's indecision and 
disorientation encouraged the aggressive acrivities of the Serb rebel forces. The 
victims of aggression. who should have been protected, got no protection and 
the aggressors were protected to carry out theu intentions. UNPROFOR has no 
excuse for this. 
The fact that UNPROFOR presence decreased rhe intensity of hostilities in 
Croatia and spared it further destrUction and loss of life is considered ro be a 
positive result of its· one-year mandate. Titis would have been true if Serbian 
aggression had not descended on Bosuia-Hercegovina in the same period, given 
greater chances for success l>y the relative peace in Croatia. It is an open (\Uestion 
whether the Serbs would have been able to fight with equal intensity m both 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. An even more unfavourable circumstance for 
Croatia is that not a single problem resulting from Serbian aggression and 
occupation has yet been solved. To what degree can UN forces be relied on to 
bring peace, security and integrity to Croatia is a question of increasing concern 
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for the Croatian population as a whole, and especially for those who were ousted 
from their homes. The citizens of Croatia had expected the international 
community, especially rhe UN, to help the displaced rerurn to rheir homes and 
the peaceful establishment of the legal order of Croatia on its who.le territory, 
so that they could start economic and social renewal and look with confidence 
into the future. This had been promised ro them by United Nations decisions. 
Today they realize that they had expected too much, and that they must in future 
place greater reliance on their own forces. 
Bearing all rhis in mind, the decision made by the Croatian authorities at the 
end of January 1993 to undertake a limited military operation and retake the 
area around the bridge on the Novigrad Strait was logical. This was an effort 
to get things moving and take practical steps to hasten solutions that were by 
UN decisions long overdue. The area around the destroyed bridge was chosen 
because it has great communications and economic importance for the whole of 
Croatia, especially for its southem part, and for all UNPROFOR activities in southern 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The operation was limited to establishing control 
over the narrow belt flanking the road to Zadar, which ran partly through the 
"protected area" and partly through the "pink zone':, but which was almost 
completely populated by Croats. The limited narure of the operation was motivated 
by the desire to avoid consequences for the civilian Serbian popuration, leave 
possibilities open for the continuation of the peace process with the help of 
UNPROFOR, but make it clear how deeply concerned Croatia is to soJve questions 
imposed by the occupation of its territory. Also, that it will not indefmitely tolerate 
the stalemate on serious activities to implement Security Council decisions. 
UN and UNPROFOR reactions in the field to this operation were sharp, but 
not deep seated. The Croatian side was accused of breaking the cease-fire, which 
would have been justified if the Serbian side had honoured the previously-accepted 
rulings of the peace plan and earlier Securiry CounciJ resolutions, which include 
many obligations for the Serbian side. Not only did the Serbian side not fulfill 
its obligations, but it systematically refused even to talk about them. UNPROFOR 
behaved as if the cease-fire was the main substance of the peace process cmd 
as if all the other decisions were merely supplementary, their implementation 
neither obligatory nor limited in time. Thus the peace process was reduced to 
the cease-fire, allowing the Serbian side to block all activities that would take 
it further than a cease-frre and thus divesting it of any deeper and more lasting 
substance. This, how- ever, is not a way to create a foundation for lasting peace 
and remove the causes that led to armed conflict. Instead it opens up a path 
to noncompliance with Security Council decisions and new conflict. 
Security Council Resolution 802 of 25 January 1993 is no clearer from that 
asp<X:t. lbe Croatian side is accused of armed attack on areas under UNPROFOR 
protection, thus leading to the rapid and intense deterioration of the situation 
in Croatia, although it recognizes that during recent months the Serbian side had 
refused to cooperate within the framework of the peace plarr. However, if the 
Serbian side refuses to implement Security Council decisions and UNPROFOR has 
neither the mandate nor the power to make it, why should on.ly Croatia be forced 
to indefmitcly tolerate aggressive Serbiru1 activities whose on.ly pw·pose i:s to create 
a lasting foundation to obstruct the implementation of the Vance Plan. The demand 
that the Croatian side withdraw its armed forces from the area it liberated in 
combat in January encourages the Serbian side to reject cooperation, although 
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it is called on tO complerely and unconditionally cooperate on implementing the 
UN peace plan and disband its paramilitary units. If Croatia were to withdraw 
her armed forces, as demanded by Lhe UN as a precondition for continuing the 
peace process, the opposite effect would ensue. Any real threat to the Serbian 
side for obstructing the peace process would be removed. 
Security Council Resolution 807 of 19 Febmary 1993 mitigates to a certain 
extent the one-sided condemnation of the Croatian side for breaking the cease-
fire, although it calls on Resolution 802 and orher earlier resolutions, and also 
on the priority of maintaining the cease-lire. The resolution explicitly calls on the 
"parries in the conflict and others who are involved to completely adhere to the 
UN plan for maintaining peace in Croatia and other obUgations they have 
undertaken". It is norn1al to expect an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate to 
completely implement the peace plan, but this is not a formal question because 
it necessarily increases severity towards the Serbian side, which does not want 
to cooperate on implementing that plan. The time limit for UNPROFOR operations 
was prolonged only until 31 March 1993, which is a really short term, during 
which more essential progress m implementing the peace plan is to be achieved. 
Because of UNPROFOR's obvious failure during the last year to justify its mandate, 
which the Croatian military operation only revealed, Lhe prolonged mandate is 
an opportunity for a new approach. lt would be unrealistic to expect that the 
peace process can end in that time limit, but it must be used for some basic 
changes that will rekindle confidence in its efficiency and provide a basis for new 
extension. The excuse that the peace-keeping mechan.il>m is not adequate for the 
real problems that demand solution can no longer be accepted, because extending 
the mandate is a chance to re-examine the mandate itself and redefine it according 
to experience to date. Now it is Croatia's turn to decide whether and under what 
conditions it will conrinue to cooperate through the UNPROFOR mechanism or 
whether it will seek alternative solutions. Possible pressure on Croatia to extend 
the UNPROFOR mandate under existing conditions, without new guarantees that 
rhe peace plan will be implemented completely, would serve neither Croatia nor 
the dignity of the United Nations. This guarantee must primarily be demanded 
in the forn1 of additional international political decisions, but also in UNPROFOR's 
greater capacity and resolution to make decisions quickly and imp1emenr them 
effectively. 
